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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction

over this appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the demand of the Palmers through their attorney,

Michael D. Blackburn, that the earnest money deposit not be
returned to the Hayes and the failure of the Palmers at any time
to offer to refund

the earnest money

deposit to the Hayes

constituted an election of the remedy of liquidated damages under
the earnest money agreement. The standard of appellate review for
a summary judgment is for correctness.1
2.

Whether the initiation of a suit for actual damages by

the Palmers after electing the earnest money deposit as their
exclusive remedy constitutes a "default" under the earnest money
agreement, thus, entitling the Hayes to the recovery of their
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in enforcing their rights under
the earnest money agreement. The standard of appellate review for
interpreting a contractual term as a matter of law on a motion for
summary judgment is for correctness, affording no deference to the

l

E.Q., Walker v. Briaham City. 856 P.2d 347, 348 (Utah 1993).
6

conclusions of the trial court below.2

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES
RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5

(Attorney's fees—Reciprocal rights

to recover attorney's fees.)
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either
party that prevails in a civil action based upon any
promissory note, written contract, or other writing
executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow
at least one party to recover attorney's fees.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to December 7, 1992, the Palmers were owners of a single
family residence located at 2792 South Wood Hollow, Bountiful,
Utah.3
The Palmers previously listed their real property with Maple
Hills Realty. They used Carol Edgmon as their Sellers' agent. Ms.

2

Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P. 2d 198, 200 (Utah 1991); Zions First
Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co.. 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah
1988); Kimball v. Campbell. 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985);
Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross. 849 P. 2d 1192 (Utah
App. 1993) ; Fashion Place Inv. , Ltd. v. Salt Lake County/Salt Lake
County Mental Health. 776 P.2d 941, 943 (Utah App. 1989); Power
Svs. & Controls. Inc. v. Keith's Elec. Constr. Co.. 765 P.2d 5,9
(Utah App. 1988).
3

R. at 245.
7

Edgmon

was an agent working with Maple Hills Realty.4

Prior to December 7, 1992, the Hayes retained Mr. Tom Baker
as their Buyers1 agent to locate a home for them in the Davis
County or Salt Lake County areas.

Mr. Baker was also an agent

working with Maple Hills Realty.5
On December 7, \W1L , the Hayes entered into a standard earnest
money agreement for the purchase of the Palmer's home.

The Hayes

paid $2,000.00 to Maple Hills Realty as earnest money under the
agreement.6
The earnest money agreement contained the following provision:
N. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the
event of default by [Hayes], [Palmers] may elect to
either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages or
to institute suit to enforce any rights of [Palmers].
. . . Both parties agree that should either party default
in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained,
the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise
or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement
or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by
applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing
suit or otherwise.7
The purchase of the home was not completed.

The Palmers

contend that the Hayes breached the earnest money agreement.

4

R. at 246.

5

R. at 41.

6

R. at 7-10.

7

R. at 10.
8

The

Hayes

contend

that

they

did

not

breach

the

earnest

money

agreement.8
The Hayes demanded return of the $2,000.00 earnest money that
they had paid to the Palmers1 Broker, Maple Hills.

Maple Hills

responded by delivering to them a document which purported to
release Maple Hills from all liability with respect to the illfated sale. Maple Hills required all parties to sign this document
before the $2,000.00 would be released.

Ms. Hayes signed the

release but Mr. Hayes refused, pointing out to Maple Hills that it
had no right to dictate any terms of such release.

He further

demanded Maple Hills to release the $2,000.00 or if the Palmers
were objecting to the release to tell him the expressed objections
that the Palmers had.9
Through their attorney, Mr. Michael D. Blackburn of Snow,
Christensen and Martineau, the Palmers objected to the release of
the $2,000.00 to the Hayes and instructed Maple Hills to not
release the money.

The pertinent part of Mr. Blackburn's letter

reads as follows:
We have been informed that you retain a $2,000.00 earnest
money deposit in your trust account. We also understand
that Mr. and Mrs. Hayes have requested a refund of this
deposit. Demand is hereby made that this money not be
removed from the trust account for any reason without the
8

R. at 246-251.

9

R. at 46 (reproduced at Tab "A").
9
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Those facts necessary for the summary judgment are undisputed.
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effort to tender a refund of the earnest money deposit to the Hayes
before bringing this suit for damages constitute, as a matter of
law, an election of the remedy of liquidated damages. The strategy
that the Palmers are attempting, in asking the court to hold the
deposit as an offset against possible future damages, has already
been litigated and clearly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court.
The election of remedies clause in the earnest money agreement
created a duty on the Palmers not to sue for damages once they had
elected to retain the earnest money as liquidated damages.

Thus,

the initiation of this suit by the Palmers while still retaining
the

earnest

agreement.

money

deposit

constitutes

a

default

under

the

This default entitles the Hayes to their reasonable

attorney's fees incurred at trial and on appeal in defense of this
action as a matter of right and law.

ARGUMENT
I.

ELECTION OF REMEDY

A.

The facts necessary to determine the issue of election of
remedy are undisputed.
The Palmers emphasize in their brief what they believe to be

disputed facts that make summary judgment inappropriate in this
case.

Their arguments, however, misconstrue which facts are

essential to the summary judgment. The essential (and undisputed)
facts upon which the summary judgment is based are only four:
11
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never

made any attempt to tender the $2,000 deposit to the Hayes; and
fourth, that the Palmers have brought this suit for damages against
the Hayes.

:

through various pleadings, but these were given by both sides to
provide a background for the court i11 making its ruling.

Only

those fact.'i I ii.itfsl ml . j" I'll • ir
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B.

Utah case law imposes an affirmative burden on the Palmers to
tender a refund of the earnest money deposit in order to bring
a suit for damages.
1

cts

-c

similar

those

issue here,

Limited.14 the vendor sued the purchase?
dHiikiyef uinlui

C*I"IIMII

11M," ».MIIM"I

moi

Dowdina v. Land

Funding

^ * O K :_ failed sale, for
agreemem

provided that, "amounts paid herein shall
seller, be retained as liquidated and agreed damages.

'tie agreement
option <>f the
The seller

12

See, letter of Edward Hayes dated February 8, 1 993 (Tab ffAff) .

13

See, letter of Michael D. Blackburn dated March 8, 1993 (Tab

"B") .
14

555 P. 2d 957 (Utah 1976).

15

Id. at 95 3

retained the $200 of earnest money and then brought suit.
response to this withholding of money the court said:

In

"[the

seller] did not, nor did his agent, offer to return the $200, which
was deposited with the clerk of the court after the suit was filed,
so [seller's] damages obviously appear to be $200 as agreed.1'16
There was no equivocation by the Utah Supreme Court.
terms

of

the

Earnest

Money

Agreement

if

the

"Under the

sale

is

not

consummated, the damages are as mentioned above, where the Seller
opts to retain the amounts paid as was the case here, where no
offer to return the sum was made."17

The Supreme Court has not

allowed sellers to retain earnest money deposits and then sue for
actual damages.

Its holding in all of the cases which have

addressed the issue is as clear as the wording within paragraph "N"
of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement that is the subject of this
lawsuit, i.e. "In the event of a default by Buyer, Seller may elect
to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages or to
institute suit to enforce any rights of seller."18

"This clause is

for the benefit of the seller. He will obviously always choose the

1€

Id. (emphasis in original) .

17-i

'Id. Accord, Close v. Blumenthal. 354 P.2d 856 (Utah 1960);
McMullin v. Shimmin, 349 P.2d 720 (Utah 1960); Andreasen v. Hansen,
335 P.2d 404 (Utah 1959).
18

R. at 10, (emphasis added) .
13
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Under those circumstances the clause should be strictly applied
against the seller and he should be held to meet its requirements
w i I" In r'»Kaifi""j]iPSS. I , 1 S
The Palmers cannot sue the Hayes for damages unless they have
first made some effort

return the $2,000 deposit to the Hayes.

Otherwise*, they mi is t: I
of liquidated damages.

the remedy
No attempt

Hayes has ever been made by the Palmers.

tender the $2,000 to the
Instead the Palmers have

against the damages to which they believe they are entitled under
this suit.20

This exact strategy has already been attempted and

rejected I: •} t:::l i€ U tal I Si ipi: erne C ::: • u : t: :i i i Close v. Blumenthal ;21
It is further to be observed that to permit the seller
to retain the money [liquidated damages] and also to sue
for specific performance would in effect render the
option clause meaningless by not requiring him to
exercise his option. It seems only fair and reasonable
that where the contract provides that the seller may "at
his option" retain the earnest money payment as
liquidated damages, in lieu of enforcing the contract,
he should be required to make his choice to do one or the
other, and to act consistently therewith. That he has
his choice is enough without giving him the advantage of
both alternatives and thus providing two strings to his
19

Close, at 857.

20

See, P l a i n t i f f s 1 Memorandum i n O p p o s i t
Motion f o r Summary Judgment.
(R. a t 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 . )
21

Supra, , i ic: > t: .< • ] 7 .

bow.
The plaintiff having kept the $500.00 must be
deemed to have kept it for the purpose indicated in the
contract, this is, as liquidated
damages and is precluded
from the other remedy.22
While Close dealt with the Palmers strategy in a suit for
specific performance, Andreasen v. Hansen23 dealt with this same
issue in a suit for actual damages. Again, the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
[T]he provision he [the seller] now relies upon gave him,
at best, a choice of two alternatives: either to keep the
amount paid in as liquidated damage, or to rely upon the
offer to purchase. The fact that the money was kept is
incontrovertible evidence that the plaintiffs exercised
the option to keep it. That being so, they must be
deemed to have kept it for the purpose indicated in the
contract, that is, as liquidated damages.24
The Palmers1 strategy has already been rejected by the Utah
Supreme Court and should be rejected here.
C.

The Blackburn letter constitutes an election of the remedy of
liquidated damages as a matter of law.
The Palmers1 brief focuses almost exclusively on the issue of

whether the Blackburn letter constitutes an election of the remedy
of liquidated damages as a matter of law.

That letter states:

We have been informed that you retain a $2,000.00 earnest
money deposit in your trust account. We also understand
that Mr. and Mrs. Hayes have requested a refund of this
deposit. Demand is hereby made that this money not be
Close, at 857.
'Supra* nt. 17.
^Andreasen. at 408 (emphasis added).
15

removed from the trust account for any reason without the
prior written permission of Kenneth F. and Rebecca A.
Palmer 25
The Palmers argue that the trial court failed to give them the
b e n e ! it fill ( iiiiiii " reason,, il 11 *
this

in m

,!•." Midi

letter which would m a k e

something

juhl h e d e r i v e d f N > M
other than what

it

appears to be on its face, i.e. , a demand that the earnest money
deposi t not he rnLeased I i m 1 he 1 Ia> es
The first inference the Palmers would like this Court to draw
from the Blackburn letter "is that * *^
[sic] it: emed^

Palmers did not elect

>
i

::: >f sar i: :ie

written form as presented." 2 1

The letter, however, does not address

any concerns that the Palmers may have had about the form c f the
release, i IC r dc € s :i t e i ei i i = .f = r t: :::: t::l: i = i: a] ease pi esei it eel lb1"1) :
Hills.

Wha t t:l le ] etter does address :i s control

of the

$2,000

deposit.

At the very least the letter m\ ist be read as an assertion

c

II o i ei:

I::l I = m o i ic= ;j b]

till: i B Pa] inei: s,

The argument by the

Palmers that, "Demand is hereby made that this money not be removed
from the trust account for any reason without the p r i o r written
permission

Il | I llh

III1.) 1 inei: s ] ' " m e a n s
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release the money to the H a y e s " is inane,

I liei

I hiin

i

Further, the attempi

Letter of Michael D. Blackburn, attorney for the Palmers, to
M a p l e Hills Realty dated March 8, 1993 (reproduced at Tab " B " ) .
26

Br

(emphasis deleted) .
]| 6

».

construe the statements of the trial court as an admission that
the Blackburn letter was "obviously" a response to the form of the
release

is

a

transparent

misconstruction

of

a

quote

out

of

context.27
The second inference the Palmers suggest "is that the letter
is not an unequivocal election of the remedy of earnest money but
is, rather, a preservation of the status quo until such time as the
Palmers had the opportunity to decide what remedy to elect."28
While it is true that the earnest money agreement imposes no time
limit upon the Palmers for electing their remedy, this does not
mean that the Palmers were free to institute a suit for damages
against the Hayes while still retaining control over the earnest
money deposit and refusing to release it to the Hayes.

The Hayes

had made demand for the return of the $2,000 when the sale of the
home collapsed.29

The Hayes were entitled to the return of their

deposit upon demand unless the Palmers elected to retain the $2,000
as

their

liquidated

damages.

Even

if the

intention

of

the

Blackburn letter was to simply maintain the status quo, the Palmers

27

See, Brief of Appellants at 18-19.

28

Brief of Appellants at 19 (emphasis deleted).

29

See, letter of Edward Hayes to Maple Hills Realty dated
February 8, 1993 (reproduced at Tab " A " ) ; see also, letter of
Michael D. Blackburn to Maple Hills Realty dated March 8, 1993
(reproduced at Tab " B " ) .
17

must be deemed to have elected the remedy of liquidated damages
because they refused to release control of the money when it was
demanded and continued to retain control over the money even after
bringing suit for damages.

In effect the Palmers are trying to

say, "You can't have your money back, but that doesn't mean that
I'm keeping it either."

The fact remains that the Palmers did

retain control over the earnest money deposit and they should not
now be allowed to have it both ways.
The third inference that the Palmers claim the trial court
failed to give them is really an argument that the trial court made
three

errors

in

interpreting

the

Blackburn

letter

and

the

relationship between the Palmers, the Hayes, and the broker, Maple
Hills.

These alleged errors are that:

(1) the trial court repeatedly misread the Blackburn
letter as an instruction to not release the money,
despite the fact that no such language appears anywhere
in the Blackburn letter; (2) the trial court repeatedly
refused to consider that the real estate broker was also
the agent of [the Hayes]; and (3) that the trial court
imposed on the Palmers the duty of instructing the agent
of [the Hayes] how to redraft its form for return of
[sic] earnest money.30
Each one of these allegations

is groundless.

Of the first

allegation all that needs to be said is that to claim that there
is no language instructing Maple Hills not to release the earnest
money in the Blackburn letter is absurd.
30

That is exactly what it

Brief of Appellants at 20 (emphasis deleted).
18

says.
The second

and third

allegations both

involve the dual

representation of Maple Hills as both buyer's and seller's agent.
The trial court did consider the nature of this relationship and
pointed out that for purposes of the election of remedies it did
not make a difference.31

The earnest money deposit was paid over

by the Hayes to Maple Hills as the agent of the Palmers. It is the
seller's agent and not the buyer's that holds the earnest money
deposit.

Thus, Maple Hills held the $2,000 as representative of

the Palmers, not the Hayes.

It was the Palmers who had control

over the deposit and were entitled to instruct their agent as to
its handling.

The only instruction that the Palmers ever gave to

their agent was to not release the money.32
The question of Maple Hills' improprieties is an entirely
separate issue.

If the Palmers had instructed Maple Hills to

refund the money to the Hayes and Maple Hills had refused or
insisted on some inappropriate form of release then the Palmers
could have sued Maple Hills for breach of their fiduciary duty, but
the Palmers never made any effort to refund the deposit to the
Hayes, instead the Palmers instructed their agent not to release
the money.

The Utah case law is clear on this point—the Palmers

31

See, R. at 368.

32

See, Blackburn letter (reproduced at Tab "B") .
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have elected their remedy by retaining the earnest money deposit
without making any effort to tender it to the Hayes.33
The fourth "reasonable inference" that the Palmers claim the
trial court failed to make "is that Blackburn's letter is nothing
more than a reminder to the real estate broker of the broker's
obligation
accounts."34
inference".

under

State

of

Utah

regulations

governing

trust

This contention strains the meaning of "reasonable
There

is no reference

in the letter to state

regulations or even to the proper handling of trust accounts. The
letter cannot be viewed as anything other than what it is—an
instruction not to release the deposit to the Hayes.
II.

ATTORNEY'S FEES

A.

General framework for the recovery of attorney's fees in court
actions.
Utah follows the traditional American rule that attorney's

fees are recoverable if provided for by statute or contract, and
that when the attorney's fees are provided for by contract, they
are only recoverable according to the terms of that contract.35 The
33

See. Dowdina v. Land Funding Ltd.. 555 P.2d 957 (Utah 1976);
Close v. Blumenthal, 354 P.2d 856 (Utah 1960); McMullin v. Shimmin.
349 P.2d 720 (Utah 1960); Andreasen v. Hansen. 335 P.2d 404 (Utah
1959) .
34

Brief of Appellants at 22.

35

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988);
Travner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984); Turtle
Management. Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 671
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agreement between the Palmers and Hayes was governed by an earnest
money agreement that states in pertinent part:
M. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the
event of default by [Hayes], [Palmers] may elect to
either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages or
to institute suit to enforce any rights of [Palmers].
. . . Both parties agree that should either party default
in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained,
the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise
or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement
or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by
applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing
suit or otherwise.36
Thus, attorney's fees were provided for by contract in the case of
default by either party.
In ruling on the issue of attorney's fees on the motion for
summary judgment the trial court held that the earnest money
agreement did provide for the award of attorney's fees in case of
default by either party, but denied the Defendants' request for
attorney's fees, holding that the Palmers had not defaulted under
the terms of the earnest money agreement. The court reasoned that
electing the $2,000 as liquidated damages and then pursuing a legal
remedy for actual damages did not constitute a default:
[The Palmers] have elected to attempt to pursue a remedy
to which they are not entitled, but they have not
"defaulted" under the Earnest Money Agreement. There
(Utah 1982); Estate of Schmidt v. Downsr 775 P.2d 427 (Utah App.
1989) .
36

R. at 10.
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apparently being no other basis upon which the [Hayes]
seek attorney's fees, and the Court having determined
that the contract does not allow attorney's fees except
in circumstances of "default", the [Hayes] request for
attorney's fees must be refused.37
The Hayes maintain that the actions of the Palmers did amount
to a default as a matter of law, and thus, the Hayes were wrongly
denied their attorney's fees in this action.
B.

The actions of the Palmers constitute a default as a matter
of law.
Black's Law Dictionary

6th Ed. defines default as "the

omission or failure to perform a legal or contractual duty."38 The
Supreme Court of Vermont, in a case with similar facts to the
present case, has defined default as being synonymous with breach
of contract when interpreting a limitation-of-remedies clause.39
There is also authority for the proposition that there can still
be a default even where there is no wrongful act.40

The earnest

money agreement between the Palmers and Hayes created a duty upon
the Palmers to not seek further damages once they had elected to
retain the $2,000 deposit as liquidated damages.

For the Palmers

37

R. at 303-304.

38

Crting, Easterwood v. Willinqham, 47 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932) ; see also. Singer Co. v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. .
558 A.2d 419, 428 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989).
39

Simpson Dev. Corp. v. Herrmann. 583 A.2d 90, 92 (Vt. 1990).

40

Sadler Mach. Co. v. Ohio Natfl, Inc.. 202 F.2d 887, 893 (6th
Cir. 1953).
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to bring the present action seeking recovery of damages while
retaining the liquidated damages is a breach of the contractual
terms

set

forth

in

the

earnest

money

agreement,

and

thus

constitutes a default as a matter of law.
Utah

law also provides

support

for this conclusion.

In

Hackford v. Snow/ 1 the Utah Supreme Court dealt with the issue of
awarding attorney's fees under an earnest money agreement very
similar to the one at issue here.

The applicable provision of the

agreement in Hackford read, "If either party fails to [perform],
he agrees to pay all expenses of enforcing this agreement or any
right arising out of the breach thereof, including a reasonable
attorney's fee."42

While the provision in Hackford and that at

issue in the present case differ slightly in their wording their
intent is clearly the same.

It is the failure to perform in one

and the default in the other that entitles the other party to
recover their attorney's fees.
The trial court in Hackford found that the party from whom the
attorney's fees were sought "had failed to comply with the terms
and the conditions of the [earnest money] agreement."43

Thus, it

was error for the trial court not to award attorney's fees as
41

657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982).

42

Id. at 1277.

43

Id.
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provided for in the contract.
The Hayes find themselves in an identical situation to the
Hackford case.

The trial court found that the Palmers' retention

of the earnest money deposit precluded the present action for
damages.45

Thus, the Palmers1 suit for damages is a violation of

the terms and conditions of the agreement, or in other words, a
default46 under the agreement.

Despite this finding, the trial

court has denied the Hayes the attorney's fees to which they are
entitled as a matter of law under the terms of the earnest money
agreement.
C.

The Hayes are entitled to the recovery of their reasonable
attorney's fees as a matter of right and law.
When a contract provides for the recovery of attorney's fees

in the case of default and a default has occurred, the nondefaulting party is entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees
incurred in enforcing their rights under the agreement as a matter
of right and law.47 This is not an equitable standard and it is not
up to the trial court's discretion to choose to award attorney's

45

R. at 303.

46

See, definitions of "default" supra.

47

Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985); Hackford
v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271, 1277 (Utah 1982); Saunders v. Sharp, 793
P.2d 927, 931 (Utah App. 1990), on remand, 840 P.2d 796, 809 (Utah
App. 1992); Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah App. 1989).
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fees once a default has been found.

Even where a party seeks to

avoid the contract, as is the case with the Hayes, he is still
entitled to the recovery of his reasonable attorney's fees for
enforcing the benefits of the agreement.48
The purpose of the attorney's fee clause in the earnest money
agreement is to protect someone in exactly the Hayes position. The
Palmers have sought to circumvent the terms of the agreement by
retaining the earnest money deposit and instituting a suit for
damages.

The

only way

that

the Hayes

could

enforce

their

contractual rights was to incur attorney's fees in their defense
to the present action.

These fees were necessitated not at the

instance of the Hayes but by the efforts of the Palmers to both
have their cake and eat it too.

The agreement

specifically

contemplates the recovery of attorney's fees by the Hayes in such
a situation.49
The trial court found that the Palmers had acted contrary to
the terms and conditions of the earnest money agreement,50 but
nevertheless, declined the Hayes their attorney's fees. The trial
court simply declined to label the Palmers' breach of the earnest

46

Cleqq v. Lee. 516 P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1973).

49

See supra, paragraph "N" of the earnest money agreement.

50

See. R. at 301-303.
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money agreement a "default".51

The Hayes seek to have this Court

rectify this verbal misconstruction and award them their reasonable
attorney's fees incurred in defending against this unjustified
suit.52
D.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 also provides for the recovery of
the Hayes" attorney's fees.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 provides that:
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either
party that prevails in a civil action based upon any
promissory note, written contract, or other writing
executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow
at least one party to recover attorney's fees.

Because of the fairly recent adoption of this statute it has not
yet been interpreted by either this Court or the Utah Supreme
Court.

All of the cases which cite the statute have found it

inapplicable because they were dealing with contracts executed
before April 28, 1986.53

The intent of the statute, however, is

clear from its wording. The statute contemplates a situation where
one party will be entitled to recover their attorney's fees based
51

See, R. at 303-304.

""Provisions in written contracts providing for the payment
of attorney fees should ordinarily be honored by the courts."
Cobabe v. Crawford. 780 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah App. 1989); accord,
Soffe v. Ridd. 659 P.2d 1082, 1085 (Utah 1983); Stacev Properties
v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Utah App. 1988).
53

Saunders v. Sharp. 840 P.2d 796, 809 nt.6 (Utah App. 1992);
Carr v. Enoch Smith Co. , 781 P.2d 1292, 1296 nt.5 (Utah App. 1989);
Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 nt.2 (Utah App. 1989).
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upon a provision of a written contract if they prevail on the
merits of their claim.

In such a case the legislature wished to

confer equitable discretion upon the courts to award attorney's
fees to the other side if they should prevail in the lawsuit even
if the contract only provided for attorney's fees to one side.
The Palmers would clearly have been entitled to recover their
attorney's fees had they prevailed in the court below.

Their suit

was to recover damages based upon the alleged default of the Hayes.
Had this alleged default been proven the attorney's fee clause54
would have been triggered in favor of the Palmers.
court's

conclusion

that the

actions

of the

If the trial

Palmers did not

constitute a default of the earnest money agreement is upheld then
the Hayes will not be able to recover their attorney's fees based
on the contract despite prevailing on the merits of the case. This
is precisely the type of inequity that § 78-27-56.5 was designed
to rectify.

Even if the actions of the Palmers are found not to

be within the definition of "default" as that term is used in the
earnest money agreement, this Court should nevertheless award the
Hayes their attorney's fees incurred in this action based on the
discretion conferred upon the Court by § 78-27-56.5.

Paragraph "N" of the earnest money agreement, supra.
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CONCLUSION
The Palmers failure to tender a refund of the earnest money
prior to bringing suit for damages and their instruction to their
broker not to release the money constitute, as a matter of law, an
election of the remedy of liquidated damages. Thus, any suit for
actual damages is precluded. The Palmers have defaulted under the
earnest money agreement by bringing suit for actual damages,
entitling the Hayes to recovery of their reasonable attorney's fees
in defending against this action.
The Hayes respectfully request that this Court affirm the
summary judgment below as to the issue of election of remedies and
reverse as to the issue of attorney's fees and remand with
instructions that the trial court issue an order awarding the Hayes
their reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this action both at
the trial court level and on appeal.
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1994.
KESLER & RUST

•7

.S1

Lester A. Perry
/
Attorney for Defendants/"
Appellees
h:\kmw\hayes\br1ef
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ADDENDUM
Letter of Edward T. Hayes to Maple Hills Realty dated February
8, 1993. (Record at 107.)
Letter of Michael D. Blackburn to Maple Hills Realty dated
March 8, 1993. (Record at 108.)
Memorandum Decision of April 1, 1994.

(Record at 296-305.)
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February 8, 1993

Maple Hille Realty
460 8outh 100 Sast
Bountiful, UT 84010
Dear Mr. Marehall{
After reviewing th e document that wee brought to our office
regarding the diap oaition of cur deposit, I regret to inform
you that I will be unable to algn it. My underetanding of
the lav ia that th e only peraon who could havo claim on the
money would be the Palmare. If they have auch a alalin,
plaaaa adviee ne. You, on the other hand, heva no legal
right to make oond itione under which the deposit would be
returned. I augge at atrongly that you either forward the
money immediately or let me know that the Palaera have
requeeted that it not be returned for soma reason.

Edward T. Kayee
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(801) 322-9123

Ron Marshall
Maple Hills Realty
460 South 100 East
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Dear Mr. Marshall:
It is unfortunate that the potential sale to Ed and
Stephanie Hayes could not be concluded.
We have been informed that you retain a $2,000.00 earnest
money deposit in your trust account. We also understand that Mr.
and Mrs. Hayes have requested a refund of this deposit. Demand
is hereby made that this money not be removed from the trust
account for any reason without the prior written permission of
Kenneth F. and Rebecca A. Palmer.
Very truly yours,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Michael D. Blackburn
MDB:skm
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH F. PALMER, JR., and
REBECCA A. PALMER, husband
and wife,
Plaintiffs,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO. 930905590

vs.
EDWARD HAYES and STEPHANIE
HAYES, husband and wife,
Defendants.

Before the Court is the defendants Hayes' Motion for Summary
Judgment. The parties appeared through counsel on March 28, 1994,
and argued their respective positions.

Following oral argument,

the Court took the matter under advisement to further consider the
written submissions of the parties and to consider in more detail
the decisions of the appellate courts of this state relating to
election

of remedies.

Since having

taken the Motion under

advisement, the Court has had an opportunity to once again review
the legal Memoranda of the parties and to review closely the
decisions of the appellate courts relating to election of remedies,
and being otherwise fully advised, enters the following Memorandum
Decision.
This is a case where the plaintiffs

(sellers) sued the

defendants (buyers) for damages resulting as a result of the
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defendants' alleged breach of contract in connection with the
purchase of the plaintiffs' home*

The defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment asserts that this action must be dismissed against
the defendants on the basis that pursuant to the contract sued upon
by the plaintiffs,

the plaintiffs have

elected

a remedy

of

retaining the earnest money payment of the defendants to the
plaintiffs, and under the terms of the contract are therefore
prohibited from suing the defendants for damages.
While there are a number of disputed issues in this case, it
is not disputed that the parties had between them a customary
Earnest Money Sales Agreement that

included

in paragraph "N"

therein, the following:
In the event of default by buyer, seller may elect
to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages,
or to institute suit to enforce any rights of seller.
While the defendants deny that they breached the Earnest Money
Agreement by failing to complete the transaction in this matter,
they argue for purposes of this Motion that even if they did
default as plaintiff alleges, the plaintiffs have elected their
remedy of retaining the $2,000 earnest money originally deposited
by the defendants with the plaintiffs' real estate agent.
has

been made

by

the plaintiffs

in oral

argument

(Much

that the

plaintiffs and defendants utilized the same real estate brokerage-
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each had different agents within that brokerage, but the Court is
satisfied that such a circumstance does not alter the result in
this case.)

The defendants further argue that the plaintiffs'

election to retain the $2,000 earnest money as liquidated damages
prohibits the plaintiffs from filing this suit, which was done on
September 28, 1993 on the theory that the plaintiffs have elected
a remedy against the defendants other than a suit for damages in
accordance with the aforementioned contractual provision.
Assuming for the sake of this Motion only that the defendants
defaulted under their obligations contained in the aforementioned
Earnest Money Agreement, the plaintiffs had two options under the
contract.

Either the plaintiffs could elect to retain the $2,000

earnest money as liquidated damages, or they could file a lawsuit
seeking damages.

It is clear under principles of law relating to

election of remedies and under the contract provisions that the
plaintiffs may not do both.
As indicated originally, and it is apparently without dispute,
the earnest money deposited by the defendants was being held by the
real estate brokerage firm, Maple Hills. Following the refusal of
the defendants to continue with the property sale transaction, the
defendants demanded from the real estate brokerage, the return of
their earnest money.

In response thereto, the real estate

PALMER V. HAYES
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a Release of Earnest Money Deposit, which

purported to release the real estate brokerage from any claims that
either the plaintiffs or the defendants may have had against it as
a result of the manner in which the real estate brokerage and its
agents in representing both the plaintiff and the defendant may
have conducted themselves.
The documentation before the Court in connection with this
Motion shows that one of the defendants Hayes refused to sign the
Release, which included a release of claims that it may have
against the Maple Hills real estate brokerage.
letter,

dated

February

8,

1993, to Maple

Under cover of a

Hills Realty,

the

defendant Mr. Hayes advised Maple Hills Realty that the attempt of
Maple Hills to insert conditions for the return of the deposit
protecting Maple Hills was inappropriate, and requested that the
deposit be returned as previously requested, or that the defendants
be advised of the plaintiffs' (the sellers) claims against the
earnest money. Maple Hills did not return the funds prior to March
8, 1993 when it received correspondence from attorney Michael D.
Blackburn, representing the sellers, that the realty company was
not to return the earnest money to the Hayes who had made a request
for a refund, and finally that the funds not be disbursed in any
fashion without the prior written permission of the sellers.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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Thereafter, Maple Hills real estate brokerage deposited the
money

into

the

Circuit

Court

in

Davis

County

and

through

stipulation the monies were transferred to the Third District
Court.
Plaintiffs argue that they did not retain the $2,000, but
rather it was retained by the real estate agent and brokerage firm,
Maple Hills.

There is nothing in the record to suggest that the

reasons for Maple Hills' refusal to return the funds were anything
other than the instructions from the plaintiffs that it was not to
release the funds.

Plaintiffs' counsel argues that Maple Hills

would not have released the funds, even if the Palmers had directed
them to do so, without the Palmers and the Hayes executing the
release in favor of Maple Hills. Unfortunately, the Court has not
been directed to any portion of the record that would so suggest,
and Mr. Blackburn's letter on behalf of the Palmers to Maple Hills
does not suggest that the reason they are instructing Maple Hills
to retain the sums rather than to return them to the Hayes is
because of Maple Hills' insistence on a release.

Mr. Blackburn's

letter on that subject to Maple Hills is silent.
The cases which deal with this issue from the Utah Supreme
Court include cases where the earnest money deposit was being held
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by a real estate agent. The fact that the funds were being held by
the real estate agent for the plaintiffs does not in the Supreme
Court decisions mean that the plaintiffs did not retain control.
It would appear from a review of the reading of the Supreme
Court decisions that a failure to tender the earnest money back to
a defaulting purchaser constitutes an election to retain the
earnest money as liquidated damages in lieu of suing for what
damages might

be proven.

The wording

of the

Supreme Court

decisions seems to suggest that there is an affirmative obligation
to tender the sums back on the part of persons such as the
plaintiffs who are required to make an election of their remedy.
There is no evidence that the plaintiffs ever tendered the $2,000
to the Hayes so as to show a non-election of liquidated damages
provision of the Earnest Money Agreement, but to the contrary,
affirmative actions on the part of the plaintiffs directed their
agent, Maple Hills, not to disburse the funds.

If such conduct

does not constitute a constructive, informed decision to elect the
remedy of retention of the earnest money as liquidated damages,
then

certainly

it

leads

the

Court

to

a

conclusion

that

a

constructive retention of liquidated damages occurred, thus binding
the plaintiffs to the decision to elect the remedy of retention of
the earnest money.
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The fact that the defendants have not made repeated requests
for return of the earnest money is not fatal to the defendants'
position.

This Court is unable to find anything in the reported

decisions that would suggest that repeated requests for return of
the funds is necessary.

In fact, the decisions do not necessarily

require that there even be a demand on the part of allegedly
defaulting parties for return of earnest money, but rather the
obligation appears to be upon the non-breaching party to make
tender of the earnest money so as to attempt to refund the same, to
avoid the election of that remedy.
In the final analysis, the plaintiffs by instructing their
agent, Maple Hills, to retain the earnest money paid by the
defendants, elected the remedy of retaining the earnest money as
liquidated damages and therefore forfeited the alternative election
of suing the defendants in damages. Plaintiffs' argument that they
never would have made such an election, because of the large
damages they claim to have suffered as a result of the defendants'
alleged breach, is not persuasive.
consciously determined

Whether or not the plaintiffs

to select the remedy

of retaining the

earnest money as liquidated damages is unimportant when their
conduct

is such that they have retained

the

therefore, advisedly or not, elected that remedy.

funds and have
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Based upon the foregoing and those other arguments suggested
by the defendants in their moving papers, and as suggested at oral
argument, the Court is compelled to grant the defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment as to the plaintiffs on the basis that the
plaintiffs have elected the remedy of retention of the earnest
money as liquidated damages, and have therefore foregone their
right to file this suit as to these defendants. The Court has been
advised that there is a request to amend the pleadings to join
Maple Hills real estate brokerage firm as a party defendant, and
this Summary Judgment will, of course, not affect that request.
The defendants further seek attorney's fees in this matter on
the basis of the aforementioned paragraph "N" of the Earnest Money
Agreement.

The aforementioned paragraph allows attorney's fees

against a defaulting party under the terms of the Earnest Money
Agreement.

While the defendants have prevailed in convincing the

Court that this lawsuit against them should be dismissed on the
basis that the plaintiffs have elected a remedy of retention of the
earnest money, that decision does not lead this Court to the
conclusion that the plaintiffs have defaulted under the terms of
the Agreement.

They have elected to attempt to pursue a remedy to

which they are not entitled, but they have not "defaulted" under
the Earnest Money Agreement. There apparently being no other basis

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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upon which the defendants seek attorney's fees, and the Court
having determined that the contract does not allow attorney's fees,
except in circumstances of "default", the defendants' request for
attorney's fees must be refused.
Counsel

for the defendants

is instructed

to prepare an

appropriate Order granting Summary Judgment for the reasons set
forth in this Memorandum Decision, and that Order and Judgment is
to include this Court's decision as it relates to the question of
attorney's fees.

The form of Order is then to be submitted to

counsel for the plaintiffs, who is to review the same for form and
if proper in form, submit the same to the Court for review and
signature,

all

Administration. .
Dated this^

in

accordance
/~\

with

the

Code

.A

T dav of Wtafi?c&} 1994.

TlMOtfHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

of

Judicial
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